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Whose account counts? 
Research in Youth Justice 
This chapter is about how, since the late 1990s, UK governmental priorities and objectives have structured 
a particular relationship between knowledge production (i.e. research) and professional practice such that 
youth justice research and practice now serve the demands of policy, rather than informing policy choices. 
In order to contextualise this discussion, the chapter starts by recounting an abridged history of the 
relationship between governmental objectives, policy, practice and research during the 1980s.  The basic 
argument is that whereas academic inquiry and knowledge production continue to exist outside the realm 
of government (and governmental objectives, policy) and are not necessarily linked to the development of 
professional practice, research within these realms is increasingly utilitarian and instrumental in 
character. Simply, „official‟ research on youth justice (i.e. that which is funded and/or consumed by 
government or governmental organisations) in that it is used to legitimate the direction and effect of 
successive political interventions into the field of professional practice.  In examining the political 
conditions in which youth justice knowledge is produced and consumed (or not) by central government, 
this chapter also provides a critique of the way in which New Labour has steered the research-practice-
policy relationship. As will be argued, „official‟ research on young lawbreakers and youth justice is 
narrowly focused and excludes questions outside the framework of specific policy or practice innovations, 
just as youth justice practice is increasingly „disciplined‟ by the dictates of these claims to knowledge that 
underpin policy via the mechanism of national standards, performance targets and guidance on effective 
practice.  
 
Shifting histories in the research-practice-policy relationship 
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In relation to adult and youth justice, the 1980s marked a watershed in the UK. The rhetoric of successive 
Conservative governments regarding adult offenders eschewed research and knowledge production in 
favour of a more or less „common sense‟ approach. Michael Howard‟s oft quoted line that “Prison works. 
It ensures that we are protected from murderers, muggers and rapists, and it makes many who are 
tempted to commit crime think twice” (Howard, 1993) exemplified the belligerent public stance of the 
then Conservative government. It rejected any pretence of fashioning a set of adult criminal justice and 
penal policies on any specialised, academic or research knowledge in favour of a simplified punitive 
approach of retributive, selective incapacitation justified by a series of assumptions drawn from literature 
and commentary from a neo-classicist tradition. In brief, writers such as Wilson (1975) Gottfredson and 
Hirschi (1986) and Murray (1990) all claimed that the previous generations of research that situated 
youthful and adult lawbreaking as at least in part determined by social environment, social ecology or 
specific economic, political, ideology and social conditions were misguided. As proof, they pointed to the 
dramatic increases in official and recorded crime rates in the USA and UK which occurred even whilst 
there were dramatic increases in the standards of living from the 1950s – 1970s in those countries. 
According to these writers, offending was a result of rational choice, the loss of self control, the decline in 
moral standards of a society and/or the simple fact that “wicked people exist”. With that, politicians and 
policy makers were at liberty to ignore generations of social and psychological research that carefully 
traced the connections between individuals‟ social context and the distribution and variation of 
lawbreaking and criminalisation.   
Despite this harsh public rhetoric about adults and away from the public gaze, youth justice 
during the 1980s bore witness to what future commentators might come to call a momentary historical 
anomaly (Hendricks 2005): a decade in which practitioners, professionals, academics and government 
worked together to create progressive practices and policies in England and Wales for young people in 
conflict with the law. In real terms the period from 1982 – 1992 saw a set of penal practices and policies 
for young people in conflict with the law which were marked by minimum necessary state intervention 
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and community supervisions that operated as alternatives to custody (Goldson 1997) and that all had the 
effect of dramatically reducing the numbers of young people in the system and/or in state custody. These 
policies had their origins in the radical and critical scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s which argued for 
radical non-intervention (see Empey 1982, Muncie and Wilson 2004) on the basis that youthful 
lawbreaking was „normal‟ (cf Matza); that all empirical evidence indicated that young people „grew out of 
crime‟; and that official state reactions and responses to crime does not stop crime, but rather 
consolidates a „deviant‟ identity (cf Schur 1973 and labelling theory). These scholars also demonstrated 
how processes of differential criminalisation lead to specific populations of young people (usually those 
already excluded and marginalised) being targetted for criminal justice interventions, the result of which 
often acted to further their marginalisation and exclusion. Indeed, it was this understanding of youthful 
lawbreaking that underpinned the the Labour Party‟s (1964) report Crime: A Challenge to Us All, in 
which it was claimed that it is only the misdeeds of working class young people that come to the attention 
of the criminal justice system, that criminal prosecution was not necessary for relatively low level offences 
and that children committing more serious offences were inneed of guidance and help, rather than 
prosecution. As Hendricks (2005) suggests, the period 1982-1992 is most likely explained not as a result 
of policy makers and politicians „listening‟ to research of the previous generations, but rather as little 
more than a happy coincidence or confluence of interests. In a context in which public spending on youth 
custody and justice interventions was escalating beyond control, a means to achieve one of the key 
objectives of Thatcherism (i.e. reduction of public expenditure) was to support the decarcerative and 
decriminalising impulses of professionals and researchers. But, as Hendricks (2005) and Pitts (2001) also 
argue, this period of progressive policy and practice came to sad end with the murder in 1993 of the 
toddler James Bulger by John Venables and Robert Thompson, both 10 years old. At that point, the same 
„common sense‟ and punitive logic that framed adult penal policies (zero tolerance, incapacitation and so 
on) came to dominant the call for something „to be done‟ about youth crime. The point of this short 
history is not to tell a tale of the demise of progressive policies and work with young people, but rather to 
highlight how little research has mattered in the shaping of youth penal and justice policies and practices 
in the recent past. As exemplified by the key moments of change, youth justice research did not shift or 
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drive a different policy or practice agenda, although the lessons and messages of research may well have 
been used by politicians, policy makers and professionals in their calls to do things differently and so on. 
There is, however, one notable exception: Misspent Youth (Audit Commission 1996) formed the basis of 
the then landmark Crime and Disorder Act 1998. It made two claims: that a quarter of all crimes were 
committed by young people and that youth crime cost the public £1 billion per anum. Ignoring the 
research which justified the progressive youth justice practices of the 1980s, Misspent Youth drew on the 
same sort of political logic that underpinned support for those practices i.e. cost effectiveness, efficiency, 
value for money. Ironcially then, the same logic which permitted progressive practice also underpinned its 
opposite: massive system expansion, recriminalisation and increasing levels of incarceration of younger 
and younger young people for relatively less serious offences (Goldson, Morgan).  
 
Evidence-based policy and evidence-based practice or policy-based 
evidence and policy-driven practice? 
 
Since then much as changed – especially in relation to the place of research in youth justice policy and 
practice. One of the key strategies in New Labour‟s modernising agenda was „evidence-based policy‟ which 
claimed to radically reconceive the relationship between knowledge production, policy and practice. 
Instead of policies based on old political ideologies and dogma, New Labour claimed to be a „thinking 
government‟ in which policy would frame practice and both would be based on evidence of „what works‟. 
The Modernising Government White Paper (1999) put forward the new formula for policy making:  
 
'... policy decisions should be based on sound evidence. The raw ingredient of evidence is 
information. Good quality policy making depends on high quality information, derived from a 
variety of sources - expert knowledge; existing domestic and international research; existing 
statistics; stakeholder consultation; evaluation of previous policies ...' (Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 
31). 
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Such was the centrality of this formula that when addressing the main independent funding organisation 
of social research in the UK, the Economic and Social Research Council, Blunkett declaimed that: 
This Government has given a clear commitment that we will be guided not by dogma but by an 
open-minded approach to understanding what works and why. This is central to our agenda for 
modernising government: using information and knowledge much more effectively and creatively 
at the heart of policy making and policy delivery. (David Blunkett, 2 February 2002, Speech to the 
ESRC)  
The task for researchers was simple.  
It is also a question of improving the focus, relevance and timeliness of research, making 
it more accessible and intelligible to users, ensuring the research funding processes 
encourage this, and breaking down the barriers of mutual suspicion between social 
researchers and those in government. Many feel that too much social science research is 
inward-looking, too piecemeal, rather than helping to build knowledge in a cumulative 
way, and fails to focus on the key issues of concern to policy-makers, practitioners and 
the public, especially parents. (Blunkett 2000) 
Noting that there are a variety of evidence-based policy models, others since have claimed the version of 
evidence-based policy adopted by New Labour is an instrumentality rationality model in which policy 
makers seek merely to manage the economic and social realms in a more or less mechanistic way 
(Sanderson 2002): a position which, as a form of government, has been critiqued as being “the policy 
sciences of tyranny” (Dryzek 1989:98) and technocratic policy making (Laswell 1951) and which relies on 
a strong central state, commanding and controlling, auditing, inspecting and monitoring (Walls 2007). In 
relation to youth justice, evidence-based policy translated into a „what works‟ approach to interventions. 
As Stephenson, Giller and Brown write: “The headline message from government is that „what matters is 
what works‟ and that practice should be derived from the latest and most reliable research findings” 
(Stephenson, Giller and Brown 2008:1). In practice, these research findings are the mass of evaluation 
studies that are now conducted on every conceivable officially sanctioned practice and policy development 
with young people in conflict with the law.  
Hence, the last decade has seen a massive expansion of Home Office and Youth Justice Board research in 
order to create knowledge where, so the official story goes, none existed (i.e. as though the previous 
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generations of social and psychological research simply did not exist). Witness, 164 Home Office Research 
Studies were published in the three decades between 1969-1996. In comparison, 503 were published in 
the decade of 1997 – 2007. Making up this figure were 154 Home Office Research Studies, an additional 
236 research studies published as online only publications and 113 specialist youth justice research 
publications currently available through the Youth Justice Board. By any account this is a tremendous 
outpouring of „research‟. And yet, despite this productivity in research, there is the troubling empirical 
reality that regardless of the claims of that research to have established „what work‟, the numbers of those 
coming into the system continue to rise as do the numbers of those being incarcerated. As noted by Carlen 
in relation to adult prisons, much of this youth justice „research‟ has become a: 
..lucrative and staple source of financing for many newcomers into the prison industry, who 
appear not to be at all unwilling to legitimate the use of imprisonment by reference to the 
„effectiveness‟ of their „programmes‟ in reducing crime. The verity of the „programmers‟‟ claim to 
„success‟ are often „proven‟ by dubious self-report questionnaire evidence from prisoners that a 
programme „works‟ – usually in terms of changing prisoners‟ understanding of their offending 
behaviour. (Indeed in view of all these „programmers‟ and „counsellors‟ claiming to have to found 
the philosopher‟s stone in relation to changing offending behaviour, it is truly amazing that the 
prisons have not been emptied by now!) (Carlen 2002:120).  
 
What Carlen is pointing to is that the „research‟ that has been produced in the last decade has (i) not 
necessarily been framed by the sort of social understandings, theoretical frameworks or methodological 
demands of social research that show the messiness and complexity of evaluating any particular practice 
or policy (Pawson and Tilley 1997); (ii) that research on justice has become an industry which generates 
its own demand and then supplies it; and more importantly, (iii) that „what works‟ research, by definition, 
cannot challenge its own terms of reference. Whilst Carlen was discussing adult prison policy and 
research, the same applies to youth justice. „What works‟ research into youth justice interventions are by 
definition incapable of calling into question their own terms of reference. In other words, the one piece of 
„evidence‟ that policy makers cannot collect, the one question that „what works‟ research into youth justice 
practice and policy cannot ask is arguably the most fundamental question: Are justice interventions in 
young people‟s lives desirable? Instead, youth justice practitioners and policy makers are treated to an 
almost endless stream of research demonstrating inter alia, the technocratic efficacy of the various 
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practice and policy developments to date. So for instance, research indicates that Bail Support and 
Supervision Schemes have a “significant impact in ensuring that young people attend court” (National 
Evalation of Bail Supervision and Support YJB 200?), and that the assessment tool ASSET demonstrates a 
relatively high level of reliability and validity in identifying factors likely to increase a young person‟s risk 
of re-offending (Baker et al 2003). Alternatively, research consumers are informed that „effective 
strategies‟ for addressing anti-social behaviour among young people are complex and that practitioners‟ 
view of anti-social behaviour measures depends on whether they view their role as enabling change in the 
young people or supporting community protection from young people‟s misdeeds (YJB 2006). Taking a 
broader view, YJB research indicates that: despite their controversy, parenting orders do have a role, if 
only to reach the vulnerable or needy parents of young lawbreakers who might never come forward for 
support in their parenting (YJB, positive parenting). Or, in relation to persistent offenders, practitioners 
are often ill-equipped to conduct proper assessments, that interventions seem to have little rationale and 
that any interventions put in placed should be targeted to specific needs / risks and be implemented 
earlier (YJB Persistent offenders). More specifically still, research confirms that cognitive behaviour 
programmes seem to reduce re-offending rates in the short term (YJB CBT) and that regardless of the 
relatively high re-offending rates, mentoring schemes acted to increase young people‟s self-confidence 
(mentoring schemes). The question, here, is not whether the research is credible: such interventions as 
parenting order, cbt programmes, mentoring schemes, acceptable behaviour contracts, anti-social 
behaviour orders are most probably benign and capable of producing the effects that the research 
indicates. The point I am making is that such a programme of official research cannot deal with the janus-
like contradiction between: (i) on the one hand the seemingly positive impact that involvement with youth 
justice workers has on young people (as evidenced in the official research); (ii) and on the other hand 
tremendously damaging impact that it can also have (as evidenced in massive system expansionism, up-
tariffing, high rates of child incarceration with all the attendant issues of bullying, self-harming, mental 
health difficulties, attempted suicides, questions over the use of restraint in custodial settings, the 
disproportionately high rates of dual heritage boys, children with mental health issues and/of learning 
difficulties coming into the system, of what this means in relation to England and Wales capacity to 
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protect and ensure the rights of children).  Nor is such a research programme capable of questioning 
whether criminal justice systems are the appropriate place to be addressing issues such as education 
(persistent offenders YJB, cbt YJB, , parenting (parenting) self-confidence building (mentoring), 
relationship building (mentoring, persistent offenders, cbt and parenting). 
Hillyard et al (2004) argue that New Labour‟s hunger for „research‟ is highly partial and selective. As they 
note in a carefully detailed article on the relationship between criminological knowledge production and 
the state, policies on corporate killing and deaths in the workplace have not been subject to the same type 
of scrutiny as more conventional „justice‟ interventions. In a similar vein it could be argued that attempts 
to more stringently regulate the activities of the City remain relatively under-researched in comparison 
with the activities of young people in cities. Their argument is that the expansion of „research‟ on crime 
and criminal justice has been of a particular nature – utilitarian i.e. research which is „useful‟ to „stake-
holders‟ and the community, often conducted by academics within universities. This is not the same as 
Blunkett‟s earlier warning to academics that their research risks being seen as irrelevant unless it can 
communicate a message to policy makers and practitioners. Rather. Hillyard et al (2004) are claiming 
that the utility of current „official‟ criminal justice research (in this case, youth justice research) is that it 
serves to maintain and legitimate particular definitions of „the problem‟ that must be addressed. In this 
case, „the problem‟ of „troublesome‟ „youths‟ (and occasionally troublesome practitioners) and how best to 
ensure that despite the social, economic and political conditions in which young people find themselves, it 
is the young people themselves that must change and adjust to their social, personal and economic 
conditions in order that they make more law-abiding choices in the future. In a final twist in this official 
tale, the partial and self-generating research into youth justice then forms the foundation of knowledge 
upon which policies regulating and governing the practitioners are based (and then subsequently 
evaluated). The performance targets, guidance on „effective practice‟ and national standards that guide 
practitioners and against which youth justice teams are measured are set in reference to the technocratic, 
highly selective, partial and self-referential research agenda that monitors the policy changes and practice 
innovations.  
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Conclusion 
 
What this chapter has not dealt with is the long history of youth justice research that indicates that one of 
most important variables in working with young lawbreakers is the quality of the relationship between the 
practitioner and the young person – a message that is continuously reinforced in the Youth Justice 
Baord‟s own research ((cf Persistent Young Offenders, Mentoring) but does not form the basis of policy 
innovation, practice developments, performance targets or monitoring exercises. Nor does it detail the 
research which suggests the importance of recognising the profoundly damaging impact on young 
people‟s lives of de-industrialisation, massive youth unemployment, shifts in educational practice which 
have shaped and conditioned informal and formal school exclusions and so on. These wider political, 
economic and social conditions have been noted elsewhere (Rodgers 2008, Muncie 2008, Goldson 1997). 
Instead, this chapter has sought to unpick the contemporary research-policy-practice relationship. It 
argued that the political rhetoric of evidence-based policy positions research as part and parcel of the 
evidentiary inventory upon which policy should be based. However, in practice the last ten years has born 
witness to the expansion of policy-based evidence where, tautologically, specific policy interventions are 
assessed and evaluated as „working‟ and because they „work‟ they then form the basis of justification and 
rationale for the policies and interventions implemented. In this context, youth justice research on 
practice and policy developments over the last ten years becomes the „evidence‟ that youth justice practice 
and policy reforms of the last ten years have „worked‟. Importantly though, official youth justice research 
also forms the „evidence‟ for the creation of a set of dictates about „effective practice‟ which in turn 
underpin national standards and the very performance measures over which individual youth justice 
services are held to account. At the risk of repetition and as argued above, research on „what works‟, by its 
nature and its inability to call into question the key terms of reference (i.e. youth offender and the primary 
aim of the system as being the prevention of offending) serves the organisational function of legitimating 
the massive expansion of youth justice at the same time as feeding through to form the foundations of 
further policy innovations (and expansionism) and the guidelines on „effective practice‟ that drive the 
work of practitioners.  
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